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SOME INTRODUCTORY OBSERVATIONS
By Bernard D. Meltzer*
Twenty-five years ago the critical issue in industrial relations was "Unions
of Their Own Choosing." We were mired in a great depression, which first
rocked the foundations of our system and then reshaped it. The resultant changes
in our social framework are now so familiar and so fixed that their significance
is sometimes overlooked. The government accepted affirmative responsibility
for full employment; it sponsored security for workers and for farmers; it expanded the regulation of financial and business practices; and, finally, it provided legal protection for labor organizations and gave them moral approval.
These changes were followed by a dramatic growth in the numbers and
power of the union movement. The new structure of unionism posed new
issues and sharpened old ones, concerning the impact of the union on the
public interest. In the 1930's the dominant issue was whether legal protection
to organization was needed to improve the balance between the power of the
workers and that of the employers. That issue has been turned on its head;
today, the concern is whether the significant increase in union power has created a new imbalance which threatens to disrupt the institutions of economic
order.' In the 1930's, the central issue was deflation; today the question is
whether inflation or unemployment or both are the price for strong unions.

In the 1930's, the issue was how to bring democracy into the plant; lately,
the question has been how to promote democracy, as well as fiduciary responsibility, in the relations between the union and those whom it represents.
It will be clear to all that the issues which I have just mentioned in
most general terms do not exhaust the problems which must be considered in
a total assessment of the impact of the modem, union; and additional issues
will emerge in the course of this Symposium. As background for the whole
range of issues involved' it may be useful to recall the ideas which, long before the depression, powered the rise of the labor movement.
Any single explanation for the growth of labor organizations would oversimplify a many-sided institution. But two recurring and related themes deserve attention. The first emphasized the destructive impact of the machine
age on the worker's value system, his sense of craftsmanship, his economic security, and on his need for fellowship. It viewed the union as the proper
response to the pervasive human desire for mutual aid, cooperation, and a
sense of status.2
This explanation interweaves with a more familiar rationale which stressed
the organized worker's unequal bargaining power. That idea, which, incidentally, goes back to Adam Smith,3 became the principal justification first,
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for increased judicial toleration of organized labor4 and then, for affirmative
legal protection.'
"Labor's unequal bargaining power" has remained one of our sacred
phrases despite telling criticism by economists.6 In dealing with the rise of the
labor movement, we need not go into those criticisms; for the presumption in
favor of free association seems wholly adequate to justify the earlier forms of
labor organization. Their powers were limited because of the pressures generated by the non-union sector. They were limited also because of employer
hostility, which, incidentally, has written a sorry chapter in our national history.
Such limited power did not warrant denying to labor unions the right of combination which had freely been extended to capital.7 Indeed, early protagonists
of labor's right to concerted action, such as Mr. Justice Holmes, were doubtful that association would raise wages.'
The union began, moreover, to have an impact on matters other than
wages. It began to create a body of industrial rights and became the mechanism of what is now called industrial democracy. Union demands led to
jointly-determined standards, such as seniority, and to grievance procedures,
which became significant limitations on arbitrary managerial power. The impact of such protection on costs was uncertain; in any event, the money costs
did not seem excessive for non-wage innovations which have been hailed as
a major contribution to an industrial civilization. 9
In the great depression, the architects of the Wagner Act suggested that
collective bargaining not only redressed bargaining inequalities, but also might
increase aggregate purchasing power and thereby might prime the pump in
the short run and stabilize the economy in the longer run.'" The purchasingpower idea has, however, been undermined by economic analysis. Thus Professor Viner reminded us that "wages . . . are both costs and incomes; as
costs, they are certainly obstacles to employment; as income they are certainly a stimulus to employment."" The purchasing-power theory ignores this duality and assumes that an increase in the wage rate means an increase in total
wages. But this assumed conclusion doesn't necessarily follow; indeed, an increase in wage rates may, because of its adverse impact on employment, reduce
the payroll.' Incidentally, the purchasing-power idea, together with "unequal
4 See, e.g., American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades, 257 U.S. 184, 209
(1921).
5 See § 1, National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141 et seq. (1952).
6 A comprehensive and critical appraisal of the considerations urged as the source of
labor's inequality is found in HUTT, THE THEORY OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING (1930).
See also Machlup, Monopolistic Wage Determination as a Part of the General Problem of
Monopoly, in WAGE DETERMINATION AND THE ECONOMICS OF LIBERALISM 49, 54-55 (1947).
7 Cf. Holmes, J., dissenting in Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 104, 109, 44 N.E.
1077 (1896).
8 See Holmes, J., dissenting in Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492, 504, 505, 57 N.E. 1011
(1900).
9 See SLIGHTER, TRADE UNIONS IN A FREE SocIErY 12; Rees, Some Non-Wage Aspects
of Collective Bargaining, in Bradley, op. cit. supra note 1, at 124.
10 See S. Rep. No. 573, on S. 1958, 74th Cong. 1st Sess. S. 1958, with minor amendments, became the Wagner Act.
11 See Viner, The Role of Costs in a System of Economic Liberalism, in WAGE DETERMINATION AND THE ECONOMICS OF LIBERALISM, 15, 32-34 (1947).

12 Ibid.; see also Haberler, Wage Policy, Employment and Economic Stability in WRIGHT,
THE IMPACT OF THE UNION 34, 55-57 (1951).
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bargaining power," implied that strong unions were an instrument for redistributing wealth from the rich to the poor - an idea which is still widely
held. But the relevant empirical evidence gives no support to the notion that
unions have increased labor's relative share. The evidence - and here there
seems to be a refreshing consensus among economists - shows that the proportion of the national income going to workers as a class has remained substantially constant13 despite striking changes in the membership and power of
organized labor.
The stability of labor's share does not mean that particular unions may
not make impressive gains through collective bargaining. But it does raise a
troublesome question: At whose expense are such gains made? We will return
to that question.
It is clear that the rationales for labor organization which I mentioned
did not provide any guidance as to the proper scale or scope of organization
in a particular industry. As unions extended their scope, a new rationale
emerged: The gains of the organized sector would be undermined and limited
by competitive pressures unless organization embraced all or substantially all
enterprises producing for a common market. In the familiar slogan, competition was to be taken out of wages.
Over large sectors of our economy, this goal has been achieved as a result of the impressive successes of labor organization following the passage of
the Wagner Act. More than 80 per cent of the employees are unionized in
such strategic industries as basic steel, automobiles and trucking; 4 and in some
cases, the same union bargains for employees in industries which compete with
each other. Mr. Hoffa, although he already seems quite busy, has announced
his dream of combining all of the workers in the transportation industry into
one massive union.
The new structure of labor power has made it plausible for employers
to borrow the ideas and slogans developed by unions. Now, employers complain about unequal bargaining power. This claim is made not only by the
small laundry confronted by the Teamsters, but also by the corporate giants.
Now, industry urges that the union may be indifferent to the fate of particular enterprises and their employees just as the non-unionized capitalist was
said to be indifferent about employing any particular employee. The circle
of rhetoric - and perhaps of reality in some cases - has come full turn.
More important is the criticism that some modem unions do not promote that elusive objective described as a social balance, but, on the contrary,
derange the economic institutions which are directed at its achievement. It
may be useful to summarize the main and familiar lines of this criticism, which
is to be more fully developed and appraised by later speakers.
The first point is that some unions have substantial monopoly powers,
whose exercise prevents the proper allocation of resources between industries
13
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and areas. The social waste which results is paid for by consumers in the form
of higher prices and by other workers who are excluded from the better jobs
because high costs mean lower output. This criticism, which was forcefully
developed by the late Henry Simons almost a generation ago,15 has become a
major theme in the more recent literature of apprehension. 6
The second criticism is the related one that some unions have exercised
their power to institutionalize so-called featherbedding practices and thereby
have unduly obstructed efficiency and growth.
The third criticism is summarized by the dictum of Charles 0. Hardy,
that "collective bargaining with strong unions, price stability, and full employment are incompatible. We can have any two of these but not all three."' 7
One aspect of this problem has recently been popularized, with the help of
the steel companies, by the slogan of wage-induced inflation or the wage-price
spiral.
The issues arising from these three criticisms are, I believe, profoundly
more difficult and more significant than the last problem which I propose to
mention, the so-called national emergency strike, which has recently been the
subject of so much public concern. Such strikes, national defense aside, typically, although not invariably, occur where large-scale bargaining has broken
down and may properly be viewed as one incident of the increased size of
modern unions and modern bargaining structures. Such strikes result, of course,
from the failures of both labor and management to devise a settlement. But
the onus of disrupting the flow of the community's income typically falls on
the union because it is usually asking for more and because it formally declares
the economic war. Critical strikes are, of course, local as well as national in
scope - as communities disrupted by public utility strikes know.
Monopoly power is, we know, a matter of degree for both unions and
enterprises. The extent of such power may vary from union to union and
within the same union at different times. Consequently, it is not very helpful to
talk about union monopolies in general. Discussions of monopoly power can be
meaningful only if we can say something about the following questions in relation
to particular unions:' 8 (1) What has been the magnitude of their impact on
wages and costs in any given period? (2) For how long a period can particular
unions continue to make gains? (3) What are the probable consequences of
such gains on consumers, on employment in the industry involved, on employment generally, on profits, and on the survival of marginal firms?
As to such matters, we look to economists for light. But even a layman
may suggest that it will not be easy to get reliable answers or a professional
consensus about the reliability of particular answers. 9 And in this area, as in
15 Simons, Some Reflections on Syndicalism, 52 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 1
(1944), reprinted in SIMONS, ECONOMIC POLICY FOR A FREE SocTY 121 (1948); references
are to the reprint.
16 See e.g., Lindblom, op. cit. supra note 1, critically reviewed by Rees, Labor Unions and
the Price System, 58 J. POL. ECON. 254 (1950).
17 Prospects of Inflation in the Transition Period, in C. 0. HARDY, K. B. WILLIAMS &
H. S. ELLIS, PRICES, WAGES AND EMPLOYMENT ("Postwar Economic Studies," No. 4, Washington: Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System, 1946).
18 Cf. Rees, Do Unions Cause Inflation? 2 JOURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 84 (1959).
19 See id. at 85 et seq.
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others, we may have to take comfort in Samuel Butler's observation that "life
is the art of drawing sufficient conclusions from insufficient premises."
The trouble with much of the discussion of the union-monopoly problem
is, however, not connected with gaps in our empirical knowledge. A good deal
of the discussion simply avoids the problem by definitions or by distinctions
which, in my opinion, don't bite into the basic purposes of our anti-trust tradition. Thus, there is the familiar observation that unions are supposed to
exercise monopoly power. The law, after all, draws a distinction between labor
markets and product markets and in general exempts union control of the
labor market from the Sherman Act. But the justification for that immunity
depends in part on the effects of union monopoly on the large variety of objectives behind the prohibition of restrictions on commercial competition objectives such as protection of consumers and of free entry or economic opportunity. And any approach or distinction which doesn't relate the consequences
of union power to the underlying objectives of the anti-trust tradition is, in my
opinion, inadequate.
Mr. Hoffa's blueprint for the combination of all transportation workers
into a single union brings the underlying problem into sharper focus. Should
the law tolerate such a union under the leadership of Mr. Hoffa or anyone
else? Should we, in other words, take the competition out of wages in enterprises which may be viewed as being in different industries which compete
with each other? Can we formulate and enforce any meaningful standards
with respect to the desirable scope of existing or future combinations, or are
the issues of size, power, and inter-industry penetration best left to laissez faire?
Another popular method of disposing of the monopoly problem is to refer to the ringing declaration of the Clayton Act that "the labor of a human
being is not a commodity or article of commerce." 20 As Barbara Wootton, a
pillar of the British Labor Party, has suggested, this declaration is worthy of
King Canute in its defiance of economic theory21 and, I would add, industrial

reality.
A worker is a resource of production. He is also, we know, a human being.
The Clayton Act is a wise reminder that errors in social policy, as well as in
labor-management relations, will result from ignoring the human facets of the
worker. But similar errors may result from ignoring his productive facet. And
to recognize that a worker is a resource of production is not to suggest that
he is to be treated like a machine or a chattel. It is instead to recognize his
social contribution and his power to get paid for his services, usually without
dependence on any one employer and without the compulsion or the benevolence of the state. And that power still has some connection with the idea of
freedom.
The third theme in the monopoly discussion has been that unions are not
the only institutions with market power. United States Steel, the union aside,
may have, we are told, more influence on prices than accrues to the Steelworkers because of the link between labor costs and prices. If the thrust of
20
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this suggestion is that we should wholly abandon our anti-monopoly laws because they are an obsolete mythology, this suggestion is understandable - although, I would urge, unfortunate. But if we are to preserve our anti-monopoly
tradition, and if both United States Steel and the Steelworkers are monopolists, both would seem to need attention unless labor monopoly acting with
enterprise monopoly is less dangerous to the objects of an anti-monopoly tradition than enterprise monopoly acting alone. The implication that two monopolies are better than one raises sharply the question of whether the effect of
the second monopoly offsets or adds to the impact of the first. 2 Are consumers, for instance, better off because a union monopoly bargains with an
enterprise monopoly?
It may be that significant monopoly power is necessary to achieve values,
such as worker-security or "industrial jurisprudence," and that such values will
be considered sufficiently important to override the social costs of union monopoly. And even if those social costs are deemed excessive, substantial difficulties of devising and enforcing appropriate remedies would remain. Nevertheless, it is clear that to appreciate the impact of union power on the public
interest we must replace exchanges of partisan rhetoric with a sober attempt
to determine the consequences of union power in particular industries and
in the economy generally. Perhaps economists are too divided and the issues
too complex to permit a meaningful consensus on what the consequences are,
let alone their desirability. But the increased and responsible concern with the
impact of union power promises to improve our understanding of the social
costs involved.
One such cost, for which union power is being increasingly blamed, is,
of course, inflation, which bears heavily on the small saver, those on fixed
retirement incomes, and civil servants and others whose pay often lags. The
unions reply that they are only catching up with prior price increases, and
both sides maneuver for the most expedient base periods for comparisons. Here
again, we turn to the economists for light. I want only to raise some of the
underlying questions: (1) What is the mechanism through which changes in
prices or wages in one sector of the economy are translated into inflation, that
is, an increase in the general level of prices? (2) Is it unions or governmental fiscal policy which is the important pressure toward inflation? (3) Does
the government pursue inflationary policies for the purpose of avoiding the
adverse impact on employment which does result from, or might result from,
"excessive" wages? And the last question is really the first question:
How much inflation have we had since the Korean War? Professor
Rees has recently suggested that, because of the upward bias in the Consumers
Price Index, "it is not clear that there has been any rise in the true level of
consumer prices over the past decade, except for the brief rise caused by the
Korean War."23 We seem to have had quite a scrap about who is guilty without any clear proof of the corpus delicti or at least without knowing whether
grand larceny or petty larceny was involved.
22
23
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The scale and power of modem unions has not only posed the formidable
economic questions which I have touched on, but has also sharpened questions about what internal union democracy is and whether it can be realized. 2 I am not suggesting any correlation between size and the grosser forms
of autocracy or corruption which Senator McClellan exposed and which inspired the passage of the Landrum-Griffin Act. On the contrary, leaders of
international unions have advanced both the ideal and substance of democracy
through the development of ethical codes and Public Review Boards. Nevertheless, we know that the difficulties of achieving responsiveness and accountability increase with size of organization, whether the organization is the state
or a trade union. In the union movement size presents, moreover, a distinctive
problem because typically at the international level there is no opposition group,
and size and centralization increase the difficulty of organizing one.25
Indeed, the managerial revolution, with its separation of stock ownership and control, appears to have its counterpart on the union side, with its
separation of membership and control. Vital decisions, such as those concerning bargaining demands and strikes, and the union's position on public issues,
appear increasingly to be made at the international level. At the same time
communication between the international officer and his constituents has become more difficult. The gap between them is being widened by geography,
by differences in outlook, and by the professional bureaucracy which surrounds
the international officer. It is far from clear that committees or conventions
or, indeed, the recent use of opinion surveys, can effectively bridge the gap.
And such a gap may persist without producing any effective challenge to the
union leadership; for the incumbents at the international level enjoy in practice
an immunity against being voted out similar to the immunity of the officers of
large corporations resulting from their control of the proxy machinery. These
institutional developments have plainly complicated the achievement of the
responsiveness and accountability implicit in some definitions of democracy.
These developments may, however, have increased the union's effectiveness as a service institution. And many, if not most, of the rank and file have
perhaps cheerfully traded democracy for efficiency. The familiar story of their
apathy suggests that a vital democratic experience in the union may be more
important to students of unionism - or to opponents of unionism - than
to most unionists.
Why then this great public concern with union democracy in a society
shot through with voluntary organizations, many of which have at best only
a democratic facade? Of the many answers which have been given, I will
emphasize only one. The union movement has, as we have seen, been justified as a vehicle of industrial democracy. The union's link with a pervasive
value of our society has served as an important justification for such disruption
as the union might involve. And the community has now insisted that the

24 See generally Magrath, Democracy in Overalls: The Futile Quest for Union Democracy, 12 IND. AND LAB. REL. Rzv. 502 (1959).
25 Id. at 514.
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union practice what it has preached26 - at least to the extent of keeping
the channels of criticism open and providing the machinery and opportunity
for democracy. If this assessment is correct, an underlying purpose of the
Landrum-Griffin Act may be said to be protecting the moral basis for unionism and, thereby, safeguarding the protection which the law has afforded to
labor organization.2"
I want to comment on one critical omission in the statute which undermines its democratic premise, i.e., the rejection by Congress of proposals to
eliminate exclusion from membership based on race, creed or sex. Congress
sought, by protecting free elections and free speech, to give to those admitted
to membership a better opportunity to choose their representatives and thereby to influence their policies. But the law gives the bargaining representative
large powers to act for all employees in the bargaining unit; these powers
extend to union members and non-members alike. Exclusion of an employee
from the union is thus a total denial of any institutionalized opportunity to
influence those who act for him. Congress, while adding to the democratic
rights of union members, at the same time tolerated total disenfranchisement
of employees excluded from membership on invidious grounds. This incongruous
result seems wholly incompatible with the democratic affirmations which accompanied the act.
Despite this difficulty and others, Landrum-Griffin is a significant attempt
to define and to protect the civil rights of union members. The contribution
of the law is necessarily limited in this area, and it would take a hardy prophet to predict its actual impact. But one concluding observation is not too hazardous. Unless unions preserve or, where necessary, develop effective internal
traditions and restraints against suppression of dissent and abuse of power, the
law may prescribe periodic and non-coercive elections, but the law may be less
pertinent than Mark Twain's observation. He told us, you may remember: "It
is by the goodness of God that in our country we have those three unspeakably precious things: freedom of speech, freedom of conscience, and the prudence never to practice either of them."

26 See Summers, The Public Interest in Union Democracy, 53 Nw. U.L. Rv. 610, 611612 (1958).
27 Cf. Aaron, The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 HARv.
L. REv. 851-855 (1960).

